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odels of bilateral contracting, such as the canonical hold-up model, typically 
assume that third parties are not available. Given this assumption, the equi-
librium outcome is not first-best efficient if contracts can be renegotiated. To be 
more specific, suppose an architect and a builder must cooperate to build a build-
ing. The quality of the building will depend on three things: the quality of the 
architect’s design, the builder’s skill, and a stochastic shock. We will refer to these 
three variables as the state of the world. The architect and the builder know the 
true state but no one else does. Thus, the state is “observable but not verifiable.” 
(An outsider may be able to judge the quality of the building after it is built, but he 
cannot disentangle the various contributions to it.) Suppose the contract specifies ex 
post transfers as a function of announcements made by the architect and the builder 
(a “message game”). If both report the state truthfully, the transfers will reflect the 
contributions of each party and provide correct incentives to invest in the transac-
tion. In order to support an equilibrium where both tell the truth, however, it may be 
necessary to punish both of them if they disagree. In the absence of a third party, 
this punishment typically involves an ex post inefficiency (say, the destruction of the 
building). If such outcomes can be renegotiated, then it may be impossible to imple-
ment the first best. This hold-up problem underlies recent work on the “foundations 
of incomplete contracts” (see Yeon-Koo Che and Donald B. Hausch 1999 and Ilya 
Segal 1999).
If we introduce a third party (who may not know the true state), ex post renegotia-
tion becomes less of a problem. The punishment can now consist of fines paid to the 
third party who acts as a “budget breaker” (as suggested by Bengt R. Holmström 
1982). Since a fine is simply a transfer from one person to another, renegotiation is 
not an issue. This suggests that models that rely on renegotiation to generate hold-up 
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In bilateral holdup and moral hazard in teams models, introducing 
a third party allows implementation of the first best, even if renego-
tiation is possible. Fines paid to the third party provide incentives 
for truth-telling and investment. This result holds even if the third 
party is corruptible, as long as the grand coalition has access to 
the same contracting technology as any colluding subcoalition. (JEL 
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problems may not be robust to the introduction of third parties. In the literature, the 
“third-party solution” has been dismissed by arguing that it requires the third party 
to be completely honest and incorruptible (see Oliver D. Hart and John H. Moore 
1988 and Hart 1995, 79–80). A corrupt third party might side contract with the 
builder to extract a fine from the architect. However, in this paper we show that in 
two important contracting models—the buyer-seller model and the moral hazard in 
teams model—it is possible to design the original contract so that no side contracting 
occurs in equilibrium and the first-best outcome is implemented.
The original contract regulates the relationship within the grand coalition (con-
sisting of the two original agents plus the third party). A subcoalition can collude 
by signing a side contract. In the previous literature, two polar cases can be dis-
tinguished. Much of classical contract theory and mechanism design considered 
the polar case where side contracting is impossible. More recently, the opposite 
polar case of “perfect side contracting” has been considered. For example, Hart 
and Moore (1988, footnote 20) put no restrictions on the ability to side contract. 
The colluding parties can in effect “merge” and thus collude perfectly. But the two 
original agents, the buyer and the seller, cannot solve their hold-up problem by an 
unrestricted merger.
In this article, we consider a case that is intermediate between the two polar 
cases of no side contracting and perfect side contracting. Our starting point is that 
all coalitions should have access to the same contracting technology. This will be 
referred to as the symmetry assumption.
1 Symmetry requires that side contracting is 
subject to the same constraints as the original contract. A recent literature develops 
this approach, including Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort (1997, 2000), 
Baliga and Sjöström (1998), Dilip Mookherjee and Masatoshi Tsumagari (2004), 
Gorkem Celik (2007), and Gregory Pavlov (2006). All of these papers build on the 
seminal work of Jean Tirole (1986).
The original contract is supervised by an original judge who collects messages 
from the agents and orders both “real” actions and transfers of money. The “judge” 
is impartial and incorruptible and may not be an actual person but a computer pro-
gram that collects inputs and selects an output. If it is a person, it can be a private 
arbitrator rather than a public official. Similarly, a side contract will be supervised 
by a supplementary judge who is similar to the original judge (and so is incorruptible 
and may not be a physical person).
2 It is important to specify precisely what a judge 
can observe, since this defines the verifiable information for the contract he super-
vises. Following Laffont and Martimort (1997, 2000), we assume any contract may 
use a message game to elicit unverifiable information from the contracting parties.
1 In reality, side contracts may be illegal and therefore harder to enforce than the original contract. We will 
show that the grand coalition can implement the first best in the symmetric case. A fortiori, the first best can also 
be implemented if side contracts are harder to enforce, since the harder it is to side contract, the easier it is to 
implement the first best.
2 Symmetry requires that all judges be identical copies of each other. We do not want to assume, for example, 
that a subcoalition can use an honest judge, while the grand coalition can use only a corrupt judge. A reasonable 
starting point is that all judges are incorruptible. If anything, intuition suggests that finding an honest judge might 
be more difficult for a colluding subcoalition than for the grand coalition.VoL.  no.    BALIgA And sJösTRöm: conTRAcTIng wITh ThIRd PARTIEs
All judges are limited by the informational constraints imposed by the physi-
cal and contractual environment. Real actions, such as a trade of commodities, are 
assumed to be observed publicly. Therefore, if the original contract implements a 
real action, then this real action is verifiable by any supplementary judge. This facili-
tates side contracting (and makes it harder to implement the first best). There are 
two possible assumptions about collusive messages and side transfers: they might 
be public and hence verifiable by the original judge, or secret and unverifiable by 
the original judge. The first case is trivial, because it is easy for the original judge 
to punish collusion if he can verify what the colluding parties are doing. In effect, 
this case is equivalent to the polar case of no side contracting studied in classical 
mechanism design. To make the problem nontrivial, side contracting must take place 
behind closed doors, unobserved by the original judge. Since the grand coalition 
should be able to use the same contracting technology as any subcoalition, the grand 
coalition also can use secret messages and side payments. The supplementary judge 
(or arbitrator) cannot use cameras or microphones to monitor the original proceed-
ings. (Alternatively, except for the real action, the inputs and outputs to one computer 
program cannot be direct inputs into the other.) The important implication is that 
messages and cash transfers exchanged under the original contract are not verifiable 
by a supplementary judge and hence not contractible for a subcoalition.

Even though a supplementary judge cannot directly monitor the original judge’s 
proceedings, there are two ways for information to leak from the original contract to 
the side contract. First, the supplementary judge may try to infer the original mes-
sages or cash transfers by observing which real action the original judge ordered. 
Second, although the original messages and cash transfers are not verifiable by the 
supplementary judge, they are observed by the colluding parties (who, after all, par-
ticipate in the original proceedings). The supplementary judge may use a message 
game to extract information about things that are observed by the colluding parties 
but not by the judge.
The first type of information leakage can be prevented by the original contract. It 
suffices to make sure the real action specified by the original mechanism does not 
reveal messages or transfers. Our paper will show that the second type of informa-
tion leakage is not a problem either. To see this intuitively, suppose the builder and 
the third party conspire to make the architect pay a fine to the third party, which the 
third party is then supposed to share with the builder. The side contract has to pro-
vide incentives for the builder to send a message in the original mechanism which 
triggers the fine, and for the third party to share the fine with the builder. By assump-
tion, the messages and transfers exchanged under the original contract are observed 
by the builder and the third party, but they are not verifiable to the supplementary 
judge. So, suppose the side contract specifies a message game, where the builder 
and the third party agree to tell the supplementary judge what happened when the 
 Hart and Moore (1988) argue that it might be impossible to outlaw collusion even if the side contracting is 
publicly observed, because the side contract might be so complicated that an outsider cannot understand its true 
(collusive) meaning. In this case, a symmetric treatment of all coalitions requires that the grand coalition also 
has access to this kind of contracting technology. It must therefore be possible for the original judge’s court hear-
ings to be incomprehensible to outsiders. This is equivalent to the case we are considering, where all contracting 
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original mechanism was played out. The supplementary judge then decides whether 
or not the third party should transfer a sum of money to the builder. However, the 
third party can always claim that the builder never sent the message, which would 
have triggered the fine, so no fine was paid. The supplementary judge has no direct 
knowledge of whether or not this is true because the original court proceedings 
took place behind closed doors. Moreover, since past messages and cash transfers 
are not “payoff relevant” (assuming quasi-linear utility functions), there is no way 
for the supplementary judge to extract the truth of the matter. The fact that the 
original messages and cash transfers are “observable but not verifiable” puts severe 
constraints on the side contract, and indeed makes it impossible to enforce an agree-
ment whereby the builder and the third party share any fine paid by the architect to 
the third party.
In the terminology of the implementation literature, “full implementation” requires 
that there are no undesirable equilibrium outcomes. If, on the other hand, there are 
both desirable and undesirable equilibrium outcomes, then the mechanism “weakly 
implements” the desired outcome. When the original contract is designed, the main 
difficulty is to ensure the existence of an equilibrium which produces a first-best, 
efficient outcome. Consequently, we begin by studying weak implementation. Once 
weak implementation is accomplished, full implementation is easy to accomplish as 
well. Indeed, there are many ways to destroy undesirable equilibria. For example, 
suppose we want to rule out an undesirable equilibrium where the builder and the 
third party collude against the architect. In such an equilibrium, the architect knows 
that he is being conspired against and that his payoff is likely to be low. (Each player 
has “equilibrium knowledge,” i.e., knows which equilibrium is played.) But it is easy 
to include a message (“blowing a whistle”) that the architect prefers to send if (and 
only if) he knows that the others conspired against him, thereby destroying the bad 
equilibrium.
We model side contracting in a fully noncooperative way, and we do not allow 
“coalitional deviations” or “mergers” outside the formal moves of the game. The 
agents propose and accept side contracts as part of an extensive form game, and 
we investigate the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of this game. In order 
to achieve weak implementation of the first-best outcome, we design an original 
mechanism which has an optimal PBE. No side contracting occurs along the equi-
librium path. To support this PBE, we must ensure that, for any coalition and any 
side contract, there exists a continuation equilibrium
4 that would be bad for at least 
one member of the coalition. Suppose the builder and the third party can write a side 
contract that induces multiple continuation equilibria, one of which is bad for the 
builder. In the optimal PBE, if the third party were to propose this side contract, the 
builder would reject it, anticipating the outcome that is bad for him. Of course, the 
third party can propose any side contract, including complex contracts with integer 
games, etc. If he proposes a side contract that induces a unique continuation equi-
librium, which is good for him and the builder, then the builder must accept it, and 
4 Since side contracts are secret, outsiders do not know that a coalition has formed. By a continuation equilib-
rium, we mean the actions the agents plan to take, conditional on what they know.VoL.  no.    BALIgA And sJösTRöm: conTRAcTIng wITh ThIRd PARTIEs
the optimal PBE would collapse. More generally, a side contract can threaten the 
optimal PBE if and only if all continuation equilibrium outcomes are good for all 
members of the coalition. We show that no such side contract exists if the original 
contract is well designed.
Formally, we will show that any side contract induces a continuation equilib-
rium where the messages sent to the supplementary judge about the original court 
proceedings are uninformative. This continuation equilibrium supports the optimal 
PBE. A collusive agreement could threaten the original contract only if it could be 
“fully implemented” in the sense that every continuation equilibrium is good for 
both colluding parties, but this is impossible. We stress that we are not arbitrarily 
introducing some kind of contracting asymmetry by requiring weak implementation 
for the grand coalition but full implementation for subcoalitions. It is an implica-
tion of the definition of PBE that a collusion-free PBE exists if every side contract 
induces at least one continuation equilibrium, which is bad for some colluding party. 
Also, although for convenience we begin by studying weak implementation for the 
grand coalition, we will show that it is easy to adjust the original mechanism to sup-
port full implementation.
In our buyer-seller model, the first best can be implemented by an original mecha-
nism that always recommends the same real action (i.e., the same trade), regardless 
of the messages. It is impossible for a subcoalition to implement fully a collusive 
agreement of the form: “if the third party receives a fine, he will share it with his 
coalition partner.” For any side contract, there will exist a continuation equilibrium 
where the third party makes the same transfer to his coalition partner regardless of 
what happened in the original mechanism. But this only adds or subtracts a constant 
from the payoffs and does not affect marginal incentives within the original mecha-
nism. It does not threaten the optimal PBE. Since the first best is implemented, there 
is no inefficiency caused by holdup.
In the moral hazard in teams model, the total output is a “real” amount of goods 
produced. This is verifiable for any judge. Unlike Holmström (1982), we assume 
side contracting is possible.
5 The third party supplies no effort but acts as a budget 
breaker. A side contract can require the third party to make a transfer to a collud-
ing team member as a function of the (verifiable) output of the team.
6 Such a side 
contract does affect the team member’s incentives in the original mechanism and 
may potentially upset an optimal PBE. Indeed, we show that if the original con-
tract does not specify a message game, then the budget breaker is redundant. This 
captures Eswaran and Kotwal’s (1984) and Hart and Moore’s (1988) insight—the 
budget breaker and one of the original agents will collude, so it is useless to include 
a budget breaker in the original contract. But this insight only applies to original 
5 Mukesh Eswaran and Ashok Y. Kotwal (1984) introduce side contracting into Holmström’s team model. 
Sandro Brusco (1997) looks at side contracting in a model where the team members can observe each others’ 
effort levels.
6 Since individual effort is unobserved, unlike in the buyer-seller model, there is nothing special about the 
number two. Implementation of the first best is difficult even when the team has three or more members. As 
Holmström (1982) showed, big teams can also benefit from a third party (i.e., an outside budget breaker who is not 
a team member). To maintain symmetry with the buyer-seller model, we assume the team has only two members, 
but our results apply for bigger teams as well.  AmERIcAn EconomIc JouRnAL: mIcRoEconomIcs  APRIL 009
contracts without message games. We will show that if a message game is included 
in the original contract, then a third party is valuable. We construct an original 
mechanism with a “whistle-blowing” clause, where the third party reveals any 
collusive activity he knows about. The original contract will not reveal whether 
the third party blew the whistle or not, i.e., whistle-blowing will not be verifiable 
information for a supplementary judge. We show that for any collusive coalition 
which includes the third party, there is always a continuation equilibrium where 
the third party blows the whistle in front of the original judge. The original judge 
then punishes the other coalition member, who therefore does not want to collude 
in the first place.
Even though the team members cannot observe each other’s effort, a message 
game is necessary for weak implementation of the first best. This seems to contra-
dict the “revelation principle”— if effort is unobserved, what is there to send mes-
sages about? In the presence of side contracting, however, the revelation principle 
cannot be interpreted to mean that the agents should reveal what they know about 
effort levels. They should also reveal what they know about collusion (by blowing 
the whistle). Leonardo Felli (1996) makes a similar point with respect to Tirole’s 
(1986) principal-supervisor-agent model.
Our buyer-seller model is similar to Segal and Michael D. Whinston (2002), and 
encompasses models that have used Eric S. Maskin and Moore’s (1999) implementa-
tion with renegotiation paradigm to provide “foundations for incomplete contracts.” 
For example, in Che and Hausch (1999), traders make cooperative investments and 
decide what quantity to trade. The first best cannot always be achieved, but the sec-
ond best can be implemented without any explicit contract. In Segal (1999), traders 
make selfish investments and n possible goods can be traded (see also Maskin and 
Tirole 1999 and Hart and Moore 1999). Under some assumptions, as n becomes 
large, the first best cannot be achieved, and the second best can be implemented 
without any explicit contract. These results are important theoretical foundations for 
incomplete contracts. We show that implementation of the first best can be achieved 
by including a third party, even if agents can side contract and renegotiate inefficient 
outcomes.
In  some  models  of  bilateral  holdup  with  renegotiation,  the  first  best  can  be 
implemented even without a third party. Che and József Sákovics (2004) consider 
a dynamic model where the timing of investment is endogenous. They show that 
the hold-up problem can be resolved, even with no contract, if the buyer and seller 
are sufficiently patient. Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, and Patrick Rey 
(1994); Georg Nöldeke and Klaus M. Schmidt (1995); and Aaron S. Edlin and Stefan 
Reichelstein (1996) also found positive results for the bilateral case. Joel Watson 
(2007) has shown that the extent of the hold-up problem depends on the technologi-
cal details of renegotiation. He argues that if the decision to take a verifiable action 
lies in the hands of individuals rather than an outside enforcer, it may be possible 
to implement a larger set of state-contingent payoffs. All these results complement 
ours by clarifying the extent to which the hold-up problem can be resolved even in 
the absence of a third party.
We now turn to the results. Section I contains the buyer-seller model with a third 
party. Section II studies the moral hazard in teams model. Section III concludes.VoL.  no.    BALIgA And sJösTRöm: conTRAcTIng wITh ThIRd PARTIEs
I.  The Buyer-Seller Model
A. The Buyer-seller Relationship
There is a buyer B and a seller s. Let b $ 0 denote a relationship-specific invest-
ment made by the buyer, and let s $ 0 denote a relationship-specific investment made 
by the seller. Let v [ V denote a random variable which is realized after invest-
ments are made. The buyer’s realized cost of making investment b is wB1b, v2, and 
the seller’s realized cost of making investment s is ws1s, v2. The vector u 5 1b, s, v2 
is the state of the world. We make the standard assumption that u is observed by B 
and s but by no one else.
Trade between the buyer and seller is represented by a set of possible real actions 
denoted by X. Specifically, a real action, x [ X, may specify what kind of good (and 
how much of it) the seller delivers to the buyer. The buyer’s gross value from the 
trade is denoted by v1x, b, s, v2. The seller’s cost from the trade is c1x, b, s, v2. This 
formulation is quite general. For example, it allows the possibility of cooperative 
investments (where one agent’s investment directly influences the other’s payoff). 
There is a “null outcome,” x~ [ X, which we interpret as “no trade.” In addition to 
the “real” actions in X, monetary transfers can be made. Utility functions are quasi-
linear in money. Thus, for example, if the buyer receives a monetary transfer, tB,   
then his final payoff is v1x, b, s, v2 2 wB1b, v2 1 tB . The ex post surplus is v1x, u2 2 
c1x, u2. Let x
*1u2 [ X be the real action (assumed unique), which maximizes the ex 
post surplus in state u. That is,
  x









The maximized ex post surplus is 
  g
*1u2 ; max 5v1x, u2 2 c1x, u26 5 v
*1u2 2 c
*1u2.   x[X
The first-best investment levels 1b
* , s
*2 maximize the expected value of g
*1b, s, v2 2 
wB1b, v2 2 ws1s, v2, where the expectation is with respect to the random variable 
v. That is, 
  1b
* , s
*2 ; arg max Ev5g
*1b, s, v2 2 wB1b, v2 2 ws1s, v26.
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We assume, for simplicity, that there is a unique first-best pair 1b
* , s
*2. The first-best 
solution to the contracting problem is for the buyer and seller to make investments 
1b
* , s
*2,  and for every v [ V  to take the real decision x
*1b
* , s
* , v2. If the first-best 
solution is implemented with monetary transfers tB and ts, then the buyer’s expected 
payoff is 
  B1tB2 ; Ev5v
*1b
* , s
* , v2 2 wB1b
* , v26 1 tB  .
The seller’s expected payoff is 
  s1ts2 ; Ev52c
*1b
* , s
* , v2 2 ws1s
* , v26 1 ts  .
B. The Third Party
A third party T may be invited to play the role of budget breaker in the buyer-
seller relationship. Thus, there are three players: B, s, and T. The third party cares 
only about money (not about x or u), and his payoff is linear in wealth. He does not 
observe u. 
C. Time Line
The relationship between B, s, and T is governed by an original contract that 
specifies an original mechanism G 0. A mechanism is a message game, which speci-
fies message spaces, and an outcome function, which maps messages into outcomes.
7 
We do not model the bargaining process, which produces G 0. We simply assume that 
at the beginning of the game that G 0 has already been determined. The extensive 
form game g1G 02, induced by G 0, is described by the following time line.
At time 0, there is a coalition-formation game with two stages. In the first stage, 
T can propose a side contract to B or s (but not to both).
8 A proposal to player j [ 
5B, s6 is an invitation to form a two-player coalition, c 5 5	 j, T 6. The proposal speci-
fies a set of “side-contracting mechanisms,” 5Gc1x26x[X .
9 As the notation suggests, 
we allow the side-contracting mechanism to depend directly on x,  the action imple-
mented by the original mechanism, because x is verifiable. At time 0,  the coalition 
does not know what real action will be implemented by G 0,  so they write a contin-
gent side contract of the form “if G 0 produces the outcome x,  then the coalition will 
play message game Gc1x2 at time 4.”
7 We restrict attention to normal form mechanisms. Allowing the agents to send messages sequentially would 
not change any results.
8 It is evident that side contracting between B and s will not be a problem. Therefore, allowing B and s to make 
proposals would not change anything.
9 The only restriction we put on the set of possible side contracts is that they be regular enough that a con-
tinuation equilibrium exists. If the strategy space in a side-contracting mechanism is an open set, for example, 
no continuation equilibrium may exist. Presumably, the supplementary judge would not tolerate it. Formally, we 
assume T can only propose side contracts with the best-response property. Each player will aways have a best 
response to any strategy chosen by his opponents.VoL.  no.   9 BALIgA And sJösTRöm: conTRAcTIng wITh ThIRd PARTIEs
If T does not make any proposal in the first stage, then we bypass the second stage 
and proceed to time 1. If T makes a proposal to player j [ 5B, s6 in the first stage, 
then in the second stage player j responds to T by either accepting or rejecting the 
proposal. If player j accepts, then coalition 5	 j, T 6 has formed, and the side contract 
is in force. If j rejects (or no proposal was made in stage one), then no coalition is 
formed.
Side contracting is done secretly. Thus, if T proposes a coalition 5B, T 6, then s is 
not informed about this (neither is s informed about B’s decision to accept or reject 
the proposal). Similarly, B is never told about any side contract between T and s. 
Consequently, if a two-person coalition forms, then the party who is left out is not 
informed about this and cannot react to it in any way.
At time 1, the buyer and the seller make investments b $ 0 and s $ 0, respec-
tively. The buyer observes the seller’s investment s, and the seller observes the buy-
er’s investment b, but no one else observes b or s.
At time 2, the random variable v [ V is realized. The realization of v is observed 
by the buyer and the seller but not by anyone else. 
At time , the original mechanism G 0 is played out among the original parties. 
The mechanism specifies a message space mi for each player i [ 5B, s, T 6. For each 
message profile m [ mB 3 ms 3 mT , the mechanism produces an outcome of the 
form 1x1m2, t1m22. Here, x1m2 [ X is a real action ordered by the original judge, and 
t1m2 5 1tB1m2, ts1m2, tT1m22 [ R
 is a vector of monetary payments, where ti1m2 is a 
transfer to player i. We require tB1m2 1 ts1m2 1 tT1m2 5 0 for all m. Thus, the budget 
must always balance. The original judge cannot destroy wealth, only reallocate it 
among the three parties.
At time 4, nothing happens if no coalition was formed at time 0. However, if a 
coalition c was formed, then the side-contracting mechanism Gc1x2 is played out 
among the coalition (where x 5 x1m2 is the real decision determined by the mes-
sages m at time ). The side-contracting mechanism Gc1x2 specifies a message space 
mi
c1x2 for each player i [ c. For each message profile m
c [ 3i[c  mi
c1x2, Gc1x2 
produces an outcome 1ti
c1m




c2 is a monetary pay-
ment to agent i [ c. We require gi[c  ti
c # 0. If there is strict inequality, then the 
supplementary judge in effect destroys wealth (see the discussion below). The side-
contracting mechanism Gc1x2 cannot specify a different real action than the original 
mechanism. Any attempt to overrule the original contract by choosing a different x 
would constitute a violation of the original contract, which we assume can be ruled 
out by the original judge. Indeed, since the physical transaction x directly involves B 
and s (but not T ), a coalition that excludes either B or s clearly cannot have any right 
to choose x.
10 However, the side-contracting mechanism can specify cash transfers 
among the coalition because these are not publicly observable.
10 If the real action ordered by the supplementary judge is publicly observable, then by definition is it verifi-
able and can be ruled out by the original contract. On the other hand, to assume a supplementary judge could 
“secretly order” a real action would have absurd consequences. To be specific, suppose the judge supervising a 
secret, collusive agreement between B and T orders a “secret trade” between B and s. That means s will receive 
an order to secretly deliver some goods to B signed by a judge he never heard of. We assume that, since s is not a 
part of the collusive agreement—indeed it is directed against him—he has no obligation to obey this order. That 0  AmERIcAn EconomIc JouRnAL: mIcRoEconomIcs  APRIL 009
At time 5,  B and s may renegotiate the decision x 5 x1m2 produced by G 0 at time 
. The renegotiation takes place in secret and cannot be observed by anyone except B 
and s.
11 With probability lB, the buyer makes a take-it-or leave-it proposal consist-
ing of a new decision, x
R [ X, and a pair of transfers 1tB
R, ts
R2 (which are added to any 
previous transfers the players have received). We require tB
R 1 ts
R 5 0. If the seller 
accepts, the proposal is implemented. If the seller rejects, there is no renegotiation 
and the game ends. With probability ls 5 1 2 lB, it is the seller who makes a take-
it-or leave-it proposal. If the buyer accepts, the proposal is implemented. If the buyer 
rejects, there is no renegotiation and the game ends. Our results are not sensitive to 
the precise specification of the renegotiation game. Any reasonable specification 
(e.g., alternating-offer bargaining) would lead to the same results.
D. The Renegotiated outcome
The game g1G 02 is solved backwards. Suppose time 5 has been reached and con-
sider the continuation equilibrium of the renegotiation stage. The true state of the 
world u 5 1b, s, v2 is known to B and s. The mechanism G 0 has recommended the 
real decision x 5 x1m2 at time . Player i receives a transfer ti 5 ti1m2 at time . If a 
coalition c formed at time 0,  then player i [ c also receives a transfer ti
c at stage 4. 
Notationally, if i o c then set ti
c ; 0. Let t ˆi denote the sum of the transfers, 
(1)    t ˆi 5 ti 1 ti
c,
for i [ 5B, s, T 6.
In the continuation equilibrium, the renegotiated outcome x
R will maximize ex 
post surplus, i.e., x
R 5 x
*1u2. Whichever party makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer 
will appropriate all the surplus. If B makes the proposal, he will make sure that s is 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the proposal. In order to convince s to 
switch from x to x
*1u2, s will be compensated by the amount ts
R 5 c
*1u2 2 c1x, u2. 
Conversely, if s makes the proposal, then B will be compensated by the amount tB
R 
5 v1x, u2 2 v
*1u2.
Given state u, real decision x as recommended by G 0, and the pair of transfers 
1t ˆB, t ˆs2, we can now calculate the buyer’s expected payoff, taking renegotiation into 
account, but not including the cost of the investment. It is 
(2)    uB1x, t ˆB, u2 5 v
*1u2 1 t ˆB 2 lB3c
*1u2 2 c1x, u24 1 ls3v1x, u2 2 v
*1u24 
  5 lB g
*1u2 1 t ˆB 1 lBc1x, u2 1 lsv1x, u2.
is, a judge has no jurisdiction over agents other than those who signed the agreement he supervises. Otherwise, B 
and T could sign an absurd agreement that would force s to hand over everything he owns.
11 If renegotiation is public, then the original contract can forbid it and use inefficient punishments to support 
a truthful equilibrium. Then, a third party would not be necessary to achieve first best.VoL.  no.    BALIgA And sJösTRöm: conTRAcTIng wITh ThIRd PARTIEs
Similarly, the seller’s expected payoff is 
()    us1x, t ˆs, u2 5 ls g
*1u2 1 t ˆs 2 lBc1x, u2 2 lsv1x, u2.
Since we know what will happen at time 5,  we will suppress the renegotiation 
stage in what follows. Thus, if there is no side contract in force and the message-
game form G 0 produces the outcome 1x1m2, tB1m2, ts1m2, tT1m22 at time 4, then the 
buyer’s final payoff will be uB1x1m2, tB1m2, u2,  as defined by (2). The seller’s final 
payoff will be us1x1m2, ts1m2, u2,  as defined by (). The third party’s payoff will be 
tT1m2. If there is a side contract in force, then the transfers 1ti
c2 i[c are added to the 
payoffs in the obvious way, according to (1).
E. Participation constraints
The buyer and seller may have the option of not trading. To formalize this, let G 0
* 
denote a “null” mechanism that simply recommends the outcome x~ and no transfers 
(there are no messages). Of course, the outcome x~ will be renegotiated at time 5. 
The payoffs in state 1b, s, v2 will be 
(4)    uB1x~, 0, 1b, s, v22 2 wB1b, v2
for the buyer and 
(5)    us1x~, 0, 1b, s, v22 2 ws1s, v2
for the seller, using the definitions in (2) and (). Under the null contract, the buyer 
will set b to maximize the expectation of (4) with respect to v, taking s as given. 
The seller will set s to maximize the expectation of (5) with respect to v, taking b 
as given. Let b ˆ and s ˆ denote the equilibrium investments. In general, these invest-
ments will not be at the efficient level, 1b ˆ, s ˆ2 Z 1b
* , s
*2. The expected payoffs from the 
equilibrium induced by the null mechanism G 0
* are 
(6)    B~ ; Ev5uB1x~, 0, 1b ˆ, s ˆ, v22 2 wB1b ˆ, v26
and 
(7)    s~ ; Ev5us1x~, 0, 1b ˆ, s ˆ, v22 2 ws1s ˆ, v26.
Of course, with the null contract, the third party plays no role and gets zero payoff.
The participation constraints will ensure that both B and s are better off than under 
the null contract. It is useful to define a pair of transfers 1tB
*, ts
*2, where tB
* 5 2 ts
*, 
such that 
(8)    B
*1tB
*2 ; Ev5uB1x~, tB
*, 1b
*, s
*, v22 2 wB1b
* , v26 $ B~
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(9)    s
*1ts
*2 ; Ev5us1x~, ts
*, 1b
*, s
*, v22 2 ws1s
* , v26 $ s~ .
Suppose the buyer and seller make the first-best investments b
* and s
* , respectively, 
and in every state x~ is implemented and transfers 1tB
*, ts
*2 are made. Renegotiation 
will take no trade to the first-best decision x
*1u2 in every state, and (8) and (9) guar-
antee that the buyer’s and the seller’s participation constraints are satisfied. That is, 
they are better off than they would be under the null contract.
F. discussion
As mentioned above, a reasonable starting point for the analysis of side con-
tracting is the symmetry assumption that the grand coalition and all subcoali-
tions have access to the same contracting technology. In our model, however, we 
have made two assumptions that give two-player subcoalitions a slight contracting 
advantage: (a) subcoalitions can destroy wealth, but the grand coalition cannot; 
(b) there is only one round of side contracting, so a subcoalition does not have to 
worry about making the side contract robust against further deviations. We will 
show that the first best can be implemented, even though two-player subcoalitions 
have this contracting advantage over the grand coalition. Of course, the first-best 
can also be implemented if this advantage is removed. Thus, the first best can 
be implemented if the symmetry assumption holds. Indeed, by giving subcoali-
tions a slight contracting edge, we strengthen our result that the first best can be 
implemented.
The assumption that subcoalitions can destroy wealth implies that a side-contract-
ing mechanism can have a “truthful” equilibrium, where the colluding parties reveal 
what happened during the original proceedings, in addition to many untruthful equi-
libria. Truth-telling is enforced by the threat that the supplementary judge will pun-
ish both colluding parties (by destroying wealth) if they disagree with each other. 
As is well known, such truthful equilibria typically exist when both parties have the 
same (unverifiable) information and ex post inefficient punishments are feasible. If 
we had ruled out ex post inefficient punishments in side contracts, then the truthful 
equilibrium would not exist, and the difficulties of side contracting would have been 
revealed even more starkly. The model would have become less tractable, however, 
because if a two-agent coalition could not destroy wealth then it might benefit from 
an outside budget breaker (for the same reason that a third party is used in the origi-
nal contract). Enlisting such a “fourth party” would open up further possibilities for 
side contracting, and the second assumption (that there is only one round of subcon-
tracting) would have to be dropped. The analysis would become quite complicated. 
Our assumption that subcoalitions can use ex post inefficient punishments means 
they have no need for a budget breaker. But in the original contract, we do not allow 
any kind of ex post inefficiency such as the destruction of wealth. Despite this handi-
cap, the original contract will implement the first best.
We now further discuss our assumptions about observability and verifiability.
First, we make the standard assumption that the state is observed by the buyer and 
the seller, but unobservable (and hence unverifiable) to outsiders, including the third 
party and all judges.VoL.  no.    BALIgA And sJösTRöm: conTRAcTIng wITh ThIRd PARTIEs
Second, we assume coalitions can form secretly. Thus, the original contract can-
not simply outlaw coalition formation. Maskin and Tirole (1999) suggest that the 
original contract might reward any agent who produces evidence of a side contract 
(and the original contract will punish the other members of the coalition). We assume 
hard evidence about side contracts is impossible to produce, otherwise it would be 
too easy to implement the first best (by simply outlawing side contracting). Any 
member of a coalition will have “soft” information about the side contract, how-
ever, and can be asked to reveal it (“whistle-blowing”). Thus, at time  a “revelation 
mechanism” should not just collect reports about the state of the world, but also 
about side contracts. (It turns out that whistle-blowing is useful in the team model, 
but not in the buyer-seller model).
Third, what goes on behind the closed doors of a judge (messages and cash pay-
ments) cannot be observed by outsiders. This assumption is needed to make side 
contracting possible. Indeed, if the original judge could observe the supplementary 
judge’s court proceedings, then side contracts would be verifiable information, and 
so the original judge could outlaw them. Since the original judge should be able 
to use the same contracting technology as any supplementary judge, the original 
mechanism can also be played out behind closed doors. In other words, since the 
original judge does not have any microphone installed in the supplementary judge’s 
court room, then the supplementary judge cannot have a microphone installed in the 
original judge’s court room.
12 In general, the outcome of a contract cannot depend 
directly on messages or cash transfers exchanged under another contract (but per-
haps indirectly, via message games).
Fourth, we assume that the real decision x produced by G 0 at time  is publicly 
observable, hence verifiable by any judge. The real decision x has a physical mani-
festation outside the court room, so unlike messages and monetary transfers, it is 
impossible to keep x secret. For example, the original judge may order the seller to 
deliver a certain quantity of goods to the buyer. This physical action cannot take 
place in secret. This helps the agents side contract, because any coalition can make 
its agreement conditional on x.
Fifth, we make the standard assumption that renegotiation at time 5 is unverifi-
able. If renegotiation is verifiable, then the original mechanism can prescribe that 
large payments be made by B and s to T, should the final decision x9 differ from the 
decision x prescribed by the original contract. Maskin and Tirole (1999) suggest that 
the original contract might reward any agent who produces evidence of renegotia-
tion (and the contract will punish the others who participated in the renegotiation).
1 
With such a scheme, even if renegotiation occurs, some of the surplus generated 
12 If agent i gives cash to the judge, who transfers it to agent j, neither agent will have any proof that the trans-
action took place. The judge does not give out any receipts (he is incorruptible so no receipts are necessary). A 
bank statement showing agent i has withdrawn cash from his account does not reveal what happened to the money. 
Even if the mechanism is a computer program, it automatically can open a new bank account in agent j’s name 
and deposit money in it. It would be impossible for agent j to prove he did not receive money in this way. Notice 
that this scheme makes it possible to secretly reward whistle-blowers.
1 A difficult situation occurs if a new, renegotiated contract surfaces that contradicts the original contract. 
Suppose the new contract is signed by B, T,  and s and contains a clause invalidating G 0. It is not clear which con-
tract would in fact be enforced. If the new contract has precedence, then renegotiation cannot be eliminated by G 0 
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by it might go to T, so renegotiation might be costly for B and s. By adding more 
and more parties to the contract, the share of the surplus going to B and s might 
be lowered even further. We assume evidence of renegotiation is impossible to 
produce, however, so renegotiation is impossible to rule out in the original con-
tract.
14 This assumption makes it more difficult to design G 0 to implement efficient 
outcomes.
Given our assumptions, a side contract for coalition c can specify transfers as 
a function of the decision x ordered by the original judge and the messages sent in 
the side-contracting mechanism. This might indirectly influence which decision 
x is implemented by the original contract. For example, a badly designed origi-
nal contract might specify that if B says the quality of the good is low then the 
outcome is x~ and s pays a fine to T, but otherwise they trade a positive amount. 
Now B and T can agree secretly that B should always report that the quality is low 
and split the fine with T. The side contract can enforce this by specifying that, if 
the outcome produced by the original mechanism is anything else than x~, then 
B pays a large fine to T. Of course, a well designed original contract would not 
reveal the messages in this blatant way. But the colluding coalition might try to 
use a message game to elicit information about the messages sent in the original 
mechanism. That is, the supplementary judge could ask B and T about what B told 
the original judge.
G. Implementation
We will design an original mechanism G 0 and construct an equilibrium of g1G 02, 
where no coalition forms along the equilibrium path and produces the first-best 
solution. In this section, we will not worry about the possible existence of other, 
nonoptimal, equilibria. Thus, this section deals with “weak” implementation of 
the first best.
In order to support an equilibrium with no side contract in force, T should not 
have any incentive to try to form a coalition at time 0. To ensure this, we need to 
show that for any coalition, there exists a continuation equilibrium that is bad for at 
least one of the members of the coalition. That is, for any possible side-contract pro-
posal T could make to player j [ 5B, s6, either the proposal makes player j worse off, 
so he will reject it, or T is made worse off, so he does not want to make the proposal 
in the first place.
We now define the original mechanism G 0 that is played out at time . This partic-
ular mechanism will be called the secret message mechanism. In the secret message 
mechanism, the buyer and the seller announce the state simultaneously. Formally, 
player i [ 5B, s6 sends a message u
i from the message space mi ; Q. The third party 
sends no message. To ensure that the participation constraints are satisfied, the pair 
of transfers 1tB
*, ts
*2 satisfy (8) and (9), with tB
* 5 2ts
*. The outcome function is defined 
as follows.
14 Another reason to allow renegotiation is that B and s may want to trade in the future. Ruling out future 
transactions might be inefficient if not impossible (B and s may use intermediaries to trade).VoL.  no.    BALIgA And sJösTRöm: conTRAcTIng wITh ThIRd PARTIEs
Rule 1. If u
B 5 u
s 5 u, then the real decision is x1m2 5 x~, and transfers are 
determined as follows. If u 5 1b
* , s
* , v2,  then the buyer pays ts
* to the seller. If u 5 
1b, s
* , v2 with b Z b
*, then the buyer pays F
1 to the seller. If u 5 1b
* , s, v2 with s Z s
* , 
then the seller pays F
1 to the buyer. If u 5 1b, s, v2 with b Z b
* and s Z s




s, then x1m2 5 x~. The buyer and seller each pay F
2 to the third 
party.
Although the messages are observed by B, s, and T, they are not verifiable by out-
siders. The no-trade outcome is always implemented to avoid signaling the message 
profile indirectly. We will show that a side contract cannot elicit information about 
the original messages, so there is no way to collude profitably. The equilibrium is 
first best, because the no-trade outcome is renegotiated to the efficient decision in 
every state, and transfers are designed to give efficient incentives.
THEOREM 1: we can choose F
1 and F
2, so the game g1G 02 has a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium which produces the first-best outcome. Transfers 1tB
*, ts
*2 are imple-
mented  by  the  mechanism  in  every  state,  so  the  participation  constraints  are 
satisfied.
To prove the theorem, we construct a PBE of g1G 02 as follows. At time 0, no 
side contract is proposed. If the players have not joined any coalition at time 0, 
then they play as follows from time 1 on. The buyer and seller invest at the first-
best level at time 1, and at time  they tell the truth (in all states of the world). If, 
at time , either the buyer or the seller deviates and lies about the state, then they 
incur the fine F
2 by Rule 2. If F
2 is large enough, neither the buyer nor the seller 
has an incentive to deviate from truth-telling. Furthermore, if F
1 is sufficiently 
big, then Rule 1 implies that both agents prefer to choose the first-best investment 
levels, anticipating that the truth is revealed at time . From this it follows that, 
if there is no side contract at time 0, then the proposed strategies are sequentially 
rational from time 1 on. The outcome is first best by construction, and the equi-
librium payoffs are B
*1tB
*2 for the buyer, s
*1ts
*2 for the seller, and 0 for the third 
party.
It remains to specify behavior after a time 0 deviation, where T proposes a side 
contract. To support the equilibrium such a deviation should not be profitable. To be 
specific, suppose T proposes a side contract to B (the argument concerning a pro-
posal to s will be exactly the same). We construct the strategies so that if B accepts 
and coalition c 5 5B, T 6 forms, then either B or T will get no more than their equi-
librium payoff. If T gets no more than zero, it is certainly not profitable for him to 
propose the coalition. If B gets no more than B
*1tB
*2 by joining the coalition, then we 
stipulate that his equilibrium strategy is to reject the proposal, and this behavior is 
certainly sequentially rational. Knowing that B will reject, it is again not profitable 
for T to make the proposal.
So  suppose  B  accepts.  The  coalition  c  5  5B, T 6  forms  and  a  side  contract 
5Gc1x26x[X is in force. s is unaware of the side contract and will play as described   AmERIcAn EconomIc JouRnAL: mIcRoEconomIcs  APRIL 009
above. The equilibrium strategies must specify how B and T will behave in g1G 02 




















for all mT [ mT
c1x~2. That is, 1mB
c, mT
c2 would be a Nash equilibrium of a game where 
only the transfers in the side contract matter. Some such pair must exist (we can 
allow mixed strategies), because T is not allowed to propose a badly behaved side 
contract that causes an existence problem. Now, we let the equilibrium strategies for 
g1G 02 specify that when c has formed, B and T choose this particular pair 1mB
c, mT
c2 
regardless of what else has happened in the game before time 4. This can be done 
because nothing that happens before time 4 can change the strategic incentives in 
Gc1x~2, which are always just to maximize one’s side payment. So, 1mB
c, mT
c2 will 
be part of a continuation equilibrium, following any history. If 1mB
c, mT
c2 are always 
sent, then B’s investment and the message he sends at time  will not affect his side 
payment, so B maximizes his payoff by making the first-best investment and telling 
the truth at time , just as if no side contract had been signed. This is then, what B’s 
equilibrium strategy tells him to do. Rule 1 will apply, and s will get a payoff s
*1ts
*2. 
But then, either B gets no more than B
*1tB
*2 or T gets no more than zero. As argued 
above, this implies that T does not gain by making the proposal. This completes the 
proof of Theorem 1.
The buyer and the third party would jointly benefit if they could enforce the fol-
lowing side contract: “The third party pays the buyer 2F2 2 e at time 4 if and only 
if the buyer contradicted the seller at time .” But this is not an enforceable side con-
tract, because messages in G 0 are not verifiable by the supplementary judge, and the 
real action is always x~. Moreover, a message game in the side contract cannot elicit 
information about messages sent in G 0. With quasi-linear utilities, previous transfers 
are payoff irrelevant, so there is always an uninformative continuation equilibrium 
where the time 4 messages are independent of what happened at time . But then, B 
may as well tell the truth at time , to avoid paying an extra fine to T.
We offer three further comments on Theorem 1.
First,  one  cannot  eliminate  the  “uninformative”  continuation  equilibrium  by 
appealing to some refinement of Nash equilibrium, such as undominated Nash equi-
librium (Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava 1991), or even by relying on vir-
tual implementation (Dilip Abreu and Arunava Sen 1991 and Hitoshi Matsushima 
1988). The reason is that a “preference reversal” condition would still be necessary. 
If the continuation equilibria are to differ across two histories of play, there must be VoL.  no.    BALIgA And sJösTRöm: conTRAcTIng wITh ThIRd PARTIEs
some agent whose preferences over two outcomes reverse (see Maskin and Sjöström 
200, Sections 4.1 and 4.2 for details). But, as we have stressed, the time  trans-
fers are payoff irrelevant at time 4. Hence, there is no preference reversal. In our 
model, coalition formation is fully noncooperative, so the only way for a coalition to 
ensure a profitable deviation is to design a side contract which fully implements it. 
Theorem 1 shows that this is impossible.
Second, like most of the literature, we assume B and s are risk neutral. However, 
suppose that they have strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. 
If the degree of risk aversion varies with wealth, and if a coalition can implement 
lotteries in the side contract played at time 4, then previous transfers become payoff 
relevant. At time 4, a lottery mechanism might extract indirect information about 
previous transfers, and enforce nontrivial side payments. However, if such lottery 
mechanisms can be part of a side contract, then they can also be part of the original 
contract, and the buyer and seller can implement the first best even without the help 
of a third party (see Maskin and Moore 1999). On the other hand, Hart and Moore 
(1999) argued that lottery mechanisms are impractical. In this case, the first best can 
be implemented with the help of a third party, by using the secret message mecha-
nism described above, because a coalition cannot use a lottery mechanism in a side 
contract to extract information about what happened at time . 
Third, we have assumed that the set of possible real actions X is describable ex 
ante. If parts of it are indescribable, it is impossible to write an original contract 
that fully identifies which action to implement. Indeed, the typical assumption in 
the incomplete contracts literature is that some actions, such as asset ownership, are 
always describable. Others, such as which object to trade, are indescribable ex ante 
but describable ex post (e.g., Sanford J. Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 
1990, and Hart 1995). The indescribability may be pertinent as it may be opti-
mal to trade different objects in different states of the world. However, as Maskin 
and Tirole (1999) argued, there is a tension between the assumption that certain 
actions are indescribable ex ante and the assumption that agents are able to per-
form dynamic programming. Maskin and Tirole’s (1999) Theorem 4 shows that a 
contract that is implementable (with renegotiation) when actions are describable is 
also implementable (with renegotiation) when they are indescribable. In this sense, 
indescribability is irrelevant and the only binding constraints are those imposed by 
renegotiation. Thus, even if actions are indescribable, Maskin and Tirole’s (1999) 
irrelevance theorem, together with the results of our paper, implies that a third party 
contract can implement the first best.
H. Full Implementation
Although, for convenience, we began by studying weak implementation, there 
are various ways to make sure all PBE produce the first-best outcome (see Palfrey 
and Srivastava 1991 for a guide to the literature on full implementation). One simple 
way is to amend the time line in Section C by allowing B and s to send messages 
at the very beginning of the game, just before time 0. We call this time 21. The 
announcements at time 21 will decide whether the mechanism played at time  will 
be the secret message mechanism described in Section G or the null mechanism G 0
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described in Section E. (Recall that G 0
* has no messages, and always recommends x~ 
and no transfers.) The other parts of the time line, such as the secret side contracting 
at time 0, are unchanged.
Specifically, the augmented secret message mechanism works as follows. At time 
21, B and s announce nonnegative integers simultaneously. These announcements 
are also secret and hence unverifiable. There are two cases.
Case 1. Suppose someone announces a strictly positive integer at time 21. Then 
there are no messages and no transfers at time , and the outcome produced in period 
 is x~. That is, they play the null mechanism at time . However, the player who 
announces the highest integer receives a cash payment from his trading partner at 
time 21.
15 If the player with the highest integer is B, then s must pay B the amount 
(10)    tB 5 B
*1tB
*2 2 B~    .
That is, the transfer equal to the difference between B’s first-best payoff and the 
payoff from playing the null mechanism. Similarly, if the player with the highest 
integer is s,  then B must pay s the amount 
(11)    ts 5 s
*1ts
*2 2 s~    .
Thus, in case 1, the payoffs will be the same as under the null mechanism, with the 
time 21 transfers added on. Notice that in this case, side contracting is moot.
Case 2. Suppose both B and s say 0 at time 21. Then the game unfolds just as 
described in Section G. Thus, at time  the secret message mechanism described in 
Section G is operated. That is, at time , the buyer and the seller make simultaneous 
announcements of the state, and the outcome is determined according to rules 1 and 
2 described in Section G. In this case, the side contracting possibilities at time 0 are 
nontrivial. 
THEOREM 2: The game induced by the augmented secret message mechanism 
fully implements the first-best outcome in perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
We prove this theorem by proving two claims.
Claim 1. There exists a PBE of the game induced by the augmented secret mes-
sage mechanism, where the outcome is first best.
PROOF OF CLAIM 1:
The equilibrium strategies specify that both B and s say 0 at time 21. After both 
have said 0, the equilibrium strategies are isomorphic to those described in Section 
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G. Thus, by the arguments in that section, there exists a continuation equilibrium 
that produces the first-best outcome.
If some player should say anything else than 0 at time 21, then they play a con-
tinuation equilibrium induced by the null mechanism. In this continuation equilib-
rium, B’s expected payoff is B~ plus whatever transfer is received at time 21, and s’s 
expected payoff is s~ plus whatever transfer is received at time 21. But at time 21, 
either s pays tB to B or B pays ts to s. If s pays tB to B, then B’s expected payoff is B~ 
1 tB 5 B
*1tB
*2, from (10). Thus, B gets exactly B
*1tB
*2, which is what he would get if 
both had said 0 (and s gets less than s
*1ts
*2 because the total surplus will be less than 
first best). Similarly, if B pays ts to s then neither agent is better off than he would 
be if both had said 0. It follows that neither B nor s has any incentive to deviate and 
say anything else than 0 at time 21. This proves claim 1.
Claim 2. All PBE produce the first-best outcome.
PROOF OF CLAIM 2:





respectively, by announcing a high integer at time 21. Therefore, in any PBE, the 
payoffs must be at least this high. They cannot be strictly greater, since the third 




A team consists of two agents, B and s. At time 1, B and s choose effort levels b $ 
0 and s $ 0, respectively. Neither agent observes the other agent’s effort. However, 
the team’s total output x [ R is publicly observable. Output is a deterministic func-
tion of effort, x 5 x1b, s2. For simplicity there is no stochastic shock (it could easily 
be added). Assume x1b, s2 is increasing, concave, and differentiable. The two main 
differences, compared to Section I, is the unobservability of b and s, and the fact 
that the verifiable outcome x is a function of b and s (in Section I, x was a real action 
implemented by the original judge).
Each agent is risk neutral. B’s cost of effort is wB1b2, and s’s cost of effort is ws1s2. 
Each wi is increasing, differentiable, and strictly convex, and wi102 5 0. The first-
best action profile is 
  1b
* , s
*2 ; arg  max 5x1b, s2 2 wB1b2 2 ws1s26.
	 1b, s2 $ 0
16 Our result would go through if the integer game is played out between time 0 and time 1. Indeed, Claim 2 
goes through because B and s can refuse to sign all side contracts and announce a high integer between time 0 




*2, respectively. To prove Claim 1, we construct an optimal 
PBE as follows. At time 0, no side contract is proposed. If the players have not joined any coalition at time 0, they 
both announce 0 in the integer game and then play as described in Section G. There is no incentive to trigger the 
integer game. If a side contract is offered, say to B, for it to be accepted it must give B more than B1tB
*2 and, for it 
to be offered, it must give T more than 0. If the integer game is not triggered, this is impossible (see the proof of 
Theorem 1). But if the integer game is triggered, the coalition of B and T can generate at most a payoff of B1tB
*2 
and this cannot make them both strictly better off. Hence, Claim 1 also goes through.0  AmERIcAn EconomIc JouRnAL: mIcRoEconomIcs  APRIL 009
The first-best solution specifies effort levels 1b
* , s
*2 and transfers tB
* and ts





*2. For the problem to be nontrivial, we assume b
* . 0 and s
* . 










If there is no message game, then, as in Holmström’s (1982) pioneering article, 
the original contract simply specifies transfers as a function of output x. Since ex 
post inefficient outcomes are renegotiated, it suffices to consider contracts that 
satisfy budget balance, that is tB1x2 1 ts1x2 5 x for all x. The budget-balance con-
dition implies that it is impossible to implement the first-best without a third party 
(Holmström 1982). However, suppose there is a third party T who does not exert 
effort, does not observe any agent’s effort, and whose transfer is tT1x2. The budget-
balance condition becomes tB1x2 1 ts1x2 1 tT1x2 5 x. If there is no side contracting 
then the first-best can be implemented by the following contract. For i [ 5B, s6, 
let
  ti
* if x $ x1b
* , s
*2
(14)    ti1x2 5 •              .
  0  if x , x1b
* , s
*2
The third party’s transfer is tT1x2 ; x 2 tB1x2 2 ts1x2. This contract (weakly) imple-
ments 1b
* , s
*2 when side contracting is not possible (Holmström 1982). However, side 
contracting compromises this particular contract (Eswaran and Kotwal 1984). We 
now consider how side contracting impacts other kinds of contracts, including those 
that ask for messages.
The time line is similar to the one described in Section C. Thus, at time 0,  there 
is a coalition-formation game where T can make a proposal to some player i [ 5B, s6 
to form coalition c 5 5i, T6. The proposal specifies a set of side-contracting mecha-
nisms 5Gc1x26x[R. At time 1, agents B and s choose effort levels b and s, and joint 
output x 5 x1b, s2 is realized. Agent i’s effort is not observed by anyone except agent 
i, but the output x is observed publicly and verifiable by outsiders. At time 2, nothing 
happens (there is no stochastic shock).
At time , the original mechanism G 0 is played out among the original parties. 
The mechanism specifies a message space mi for each player i [ 5B, s, T 6. For each 
message profile m [ mB 3 ms 3 mT and output x [ R, the transfers are 1tB1m, x2, 
ts1m, x2, tT1m, x22. We require tB1m, x2 1 ts1m, x2 1 tT1m, x2 5 x for all x.
At time 4, nothing happens if no coalition was formed at time 0. However, if a 
coalition c was formed, then the side contract Gc1x2 is played out among the coalition 
(where x is the output realized at stage 1). The side contract Gc1x2 specifies a message 
space mi
c1x2 for each player i [ c. For each message profile m
c[ 3 i[c  mi
c1x2 and 
output x, Gc1x2 specifies transfers 1ti
c1m
c , x22 i[c. Here, ti
c 5 ti
c1m
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payment that agent i [ c receives when messages m
c are sent at time 4, and x is the 
team output. Finally, at time 5, there is no scope for renegotiation because the budget 
is balanced and there is no real decision to be made.
An effort profile 1b, s2 is (weakly) implementable if there is an original mecha-
nism G 0 such that the induced game g1G 02 has a PBE where the effort levels are 
1b, s2. Since effort is unobserved, intuition suggests that the message game at time 
 is redundant. This intuition is incorrect, however. To see this, we first consider 
implementation without message games (mB 5 ms 5 mT 5 ~). We will show that in 
this case the third party plays no useful role. This generalizes Eswaran and Kotwal’s 
(1984) result in a way reminiscent of footnote 20 in Hart and Moore (1988).
THEOREM : If we restrict attention to original contracts without messages, then 
introducing a third party does not expand the set of implementable effort profiles.
To prove the theorem, suppose there is a third party T, and the effort profile 1b ˆ, s ˆ2 
is implemented by G 0 without messages. We show that 1b ˆ, s ˆ2 can also be implemented 
without a third party. There are two cases depending on whether or not a side con-
tract is in force in equilibrium.
Case 1: The PBE of g1G 02 which implements 1b ˆ, s ˆ2 is such that, in equilibrium, a 
side contract is in force. To be specific, suppose coalition c 5 5B, T 6 forms with side 
contract 5Gc1x26x[R.
Notice that s will maximize his payoff only if, for all s9 $ 0,
(15)    ts1x1b ˆ, s ˆ22 2 ws1s ˆ2 $ ts1x1b ˆ, s922 2 ws1s92.
If B rejects T’s proposal, his payoff is sure to be 
  m ; max 5tB1x1b, s ˆ22 2 wB1b26.
  b $ 0
Indeed, s does not observe the side contract, hence his choice of s ˆ is independent 
of it. Since B will accept any proposal that gives him more than m, in fact, B’s 
equilibrium payoff must be exactly m. The third party’s equilibrium payoff must 
then be
(16)    tB1x1b ˆ, s ˆ22 1 tT1x1b ˆ, s ˆ22 2 wB1b ˆ2 2 m.
Claim 1. For all b9 $ 0,
(17)    tB1x1b ˆ, s ˆ22 1 tT1x1b ˆ, s ˆ22 2 wB1b ˆ2 $ tB1x1b9 , s ˆ22 1 tT1x1b9 , s ˆ22 2 wB1b92.
PROOF OF CLAIM 1:
Suppose there is b9 $ 0 such that (17) is violated. Suppose T deviates from the 
equilibrium by offering B the following side contract. If x 5 x1b9 , s ˆ2, then T pays B a 
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(18)  tB1x1b9 , s ˆ22 1 t ˆB 2 wB1b92 5 m 1 e,
where e . 0. If x Z x1b9 , s ˆ2, then B pays a big fine to T. (There are no messages in the 
side contract.) Since B only gets m by rejecting, (18) implies that the unique, sequen-
tially rational response is to accept and choose b9 so that the output is x1b9 , s ˆ2. Then 
T’s payoff will be 
(19)    tT1x1b9 , s ˆ22 2 t ˆB 5 tB1x1b9 , s ˆ22 1 tT1x1b9 , s ˆ22 2 wB1b92 2 1m 1 e2,
where the equality uses (18). But, for small enough e . 0, the violation of (17) 
implies that (19) is strictly greater than (16). Therefore, T is strictly better off by 
proposing the new side contract, contradicting the definition of PBE. This proves 
the claim.
Suppose we get rid of the third party, and any transfer that T would have received 
is added to B’s transfer, so B’s transfer is tB1x2 1 tT1x2 for any x. Now (15) and (17) 
imply that this new mechanism implements 1b ˆ, s ˆ2, so, if case 1 applies, then the third 
party is useless.
Case 2: The PBE of g1G 02 which implements 1b ˆ, s ˆ2 is such that, in equilibrium, no 
side contract is in force.
In this case, the proof of Claim 1 goes through, so for any b9 $ 0, (17) must hold. 
But then, just as in case 1, we can get rid of the third party. This completes the proof 
of Theorem .
Theorem  implies that, if the original contract does not include a message game, 
then the first best is unattainable, even if a third party is available. We now show that 
an original mechanism with a message game can implement the first best, as long as 
a third party is available. This particular mechanism, G 0 , will be called the whistle-
blowing mechanism. In this mechanism, only T sends a message at time , with mes-
sage space mT 5 5~, b, s6. Message ~ is interpreted as “stay quiet,” b is interpreted 
as “blow the whistle on agent B,” and s is interpreted as “blow the whistle on agent 
s.” The message is observed by B and s  but not by outsiders.
Recall that 1tB
*, ts
*2 are transfers which satisfy (12) and (1). The outcome function 
is as follows.
Rule 1. If x 5 x1b
* , s
*2, pay ti 5 ti
* to each i [ 5B, s6, and set tT 5 0.
Rule 2. If x Z x1b
* , s
*2 and T reports b, then B is paid tB 5 2F, T is paid tT 5 x 1 F, 
and s is paid ts 5 F.
Rule 3. If x Z x1b
* , s
*2 and T reports s, then s is paid ts 5 2F, T is paid tT 5 x 1 F, 
and B is paid tB 5 F.
Rule 4. If x Z x1b
* , s
*2 and T reports ~, then pay tT 5 x to T, and set tB 5 ts 5 0.
The key idea is that if the output is not first best and the third party “blows the 
whistle” on someone, then that person is punished (by Rule 2 or Rule ). If B and s VoL.  no.    BALIgA And sJösTRöm: conTRAcTIng wITh ThIRd PARTIEs
expect that the third party will blow the whistle on them if they try to side contract 
with him, side contracting will be deterred. They will only want to accept the third 
party’s proposal if the side contract can deter whistle blowing. Conversely, side con-
tracting is prevented if every side contract induces a continuation equilibrium with 
whistle-blowing.
THEOREM 4: we can choose F . 0, so that the game g1G 02 has a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium which implements the first-best outcome.
To prove the theorem, a PBE which implements the first-best outcome is con-
structed as follows. At time 0, T’s strategy specifies that no side contract is proposed. 
At time 1, any agent who has not signed a side contract sets effort at the first-best 
level. At time ,  T stays quiet if no side contract is in force.
Notice that the third party cannot effect the outcome by blowing the whistle on 
either agent as long as x 5 x1b
* , s
*2 (by Rule 1). At time 1, Rules 1 and 4 imply that 
both agents want to choose the first-best actions, anticipating that a deviation will 
lead to the entire output being given to the third party. From this it follows that, if 
there is no side contract in force at time 0, then the proposed strategies are sequen-
tially rational from time 1 on. The outcome is first-best by construction.
It remains to specify behavior after a time 0 deviation, where T proposes a side 
contract. To support the equilibrium, such a deviation should not be profitable. To 
be specific, suppose T makes a proposal to B (the argument is similar for a pro-
posal to s). We construct the strategies so that if B accepts and coalition c 5 5B, T 6 
forms, then either B or T will get no more than their equilibrium payoff. If T gets 
no more than zero, it is certainly not profitable for him to propose the coalition. If 
B gets no more than B
* from joining the coalition, then we stipulate that his equi-
librium strategy is to reject the proposal, and this behavior is certainly sequentially 
rational. Knowing that B will reject, it is again not profitable for T to make the 
proposal.
So suppose B accepts the proposal. The coalition c 5 5B, T 6 forms and a set of 
side-contracting mechanisms 5Gc1x26x[x is in force. s is unaware of a deviation and 
will play as described above, i.e., his effort is s
*. The equilibrium strategies need to 
specify how the coalition of B and T will behave in g1G 02 following the deviation. 
Moreover, strategies should be such that either B gets less than B
* , or T gets less than 
0. Also, we specify, if possible, that T and B believe that s chose the effort s 5 s
* at 
time 1. In addition, if possible, T infers B’s effort from the joint output, assuming 
s 5 s
*. In other cases, i.e., if x is inconsistent with s 5 s
*, then we may leave the 
beliefs unspecified.
For a given x, the message game in the side contract cannot be used to (uniquely) 
extract truthful information about whether or not T blew the whistle in G 0. This argu-
ment is the same as in Section G. Since T’s message in G 0 only changes the transfers, 
the strategic incentives in the side-contracting mechanism Gc1x2 do not depend on it. 
That is, whistle-blowing does not induce any “preference reversal” at time 4. Hence, 
the side contract Gc1x2 cannot be designed to (uniquely) extract information about 
whether or not T blew the whistle at time . By assumption, the side contract must 
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contract that causes an existence problem). By the payoff-irrelevance argument, we 
may assume the continuation equilibrium strategies are such that the messages sent 
at time 4 by B and T only depend on x,  not on whether or not T blew the whistle at 
time .
At time , we specify that T blows the whistle on B. As F . 0, this is sequentially 
rational for T.
Under this specification, if the coalition c 5 5B, T 6 forms, either Rule 1 or Rule 
2 will apply at time . In either case, if F is large enough, s will not get less than his 
equilibrium payoff s
*. But then, at least one of the members of the coalition is not 
made strictly better off. As argued above, this implies that T does not gain by mak-
ing the proposal. This completes the proof of Theorem 4. 
The key to the equilibrium construction is the third party’s behavior at time . He 
stays quiet at time  if no side contract is in force. But if he belongs to a coalition, 
then he blows the whistle on the other member of the coalition. In order to be assured 
of a profitable deviation, the agents should design a side contract where whistle-
blowing is punished, and therefore not attractive to T, in all continuation equilibria. 
However, this is impossible because blowing the whistle only triggers a monetary 
reward which is not “payoff relevant” at time 4. Thus, all side contracts must have a 
continuation equilibrium where whistle-blowing is not punished, and in such a con-
tinuation equilibrium, the third party may as well blow the whistle. We support the 
optimal PBE of g1G 02 by selecting the “whistle-blowing continuation equilibrium” 
whenever a coalition is formed. As before, full implementation of the first-best can 
be achieved by augmenting the mechanism.
III.  Concluding Comments
The theory of mechanism design studies the question: given some desirable out-
come, does there exist a mechanism (contract) which implements it? If information 
is complete, the answer is often yes, although the optimal contract is typically quite 
complex (see Maskin and Sjöström 200). However, there is one case where even 
implementation with complete information is quite difficult. That is, when there are 
only two agents and they can renegotiate inefficient outcomes (Maskin and Moore 
1999). This case is emphasized in contract theory. If a third party is added, then 
the problem of renegotiation is less severe, but collusion may be a problem. The 
key issue becomes, what variables are contractible for a colluding subcoalition? To 
address this issue, a natural starting point is a symmetry assumption—the grand 
coalition and all subcoalitions have access to the same contracting technology. The 
symmetric case is intermediate between the two polar cases of no side contracting 
and perfect side contracting that have been prominent in the literature.
For collusion to be a problem, the collusive activity (including messages and side 
payments) must take place behind closed doors. It cannot be verifiable information 
for the judge who supervises the original contract, otherwise, he could punish the 
colluders. By symmetry, the original judge should be able to conduct his proceed-
ings behind closed doors. Therefore, messages and cash transfers exchanged under 
the original contract are not verifiable information for the judge who supervises VoL.  no.    BALIgA And sJösTRöm: conTRAcTIng wITh ThIRd PARTIEs
the side contract. But this puts severe constraints on the ability to collude. We have 
shown that, as a consequence, the first best can be implemented in two well-known 
models, the buyer-seller model and the moral hazard in teams model.
Our results seem to suggest that collusion may not matter too much, and there may 
be no inefficiencies caused by “hold up.” Notice, however, that we make some strong 
(but common) assumptions. We assume the original contract can impose large fines 
on the buyer and seller. In reality, fines may be restricted due to wealth constraints 
and limited liability. Adding limited liability constraints to the original contract-
ing problem would make implementation harder. Of course, symmetry recommends 
imposing the same constraints on side contracting, as in Baliga and Sjöström (1998). 
We also assume the seller and the buyer have complete information about the true 
state of the world. If this assumption is dropped, the original contract is subject to 
incentive-compatibility constraints. Again, symmetry recommends imposing incen-
tive-compatibility constraints also on side contracts, as in Laffont and Martimort 
(1997, 2000). Future research might reveal the exact circumstances where collusion 
matters, where contracts are optimally “incomplete,” and where the hold-up problem 
cannot be fully resolved.
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